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No. 20061177-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, an agency of the State of Utah, 
and UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
Respondents. 
RULE 35 PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS 
Based on Rules 35 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Respondent Utah Department of Workforce Services, by and through its 
counsel, J. Clifford Petersen, hereby submits this Suggestion of Mootness and 
Petition for Rehearing of the Court's decision in this matter filed on March 
13, 2008. 
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS 
This Court's prior decision in Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2007 
UT App 280, 167 P.3d 1102 (Blauer I), has rendered this case moot. That 
decision was issued after the Department filed its answer brief in this case. 
In that decision, this Court affirmed the termination of Blauer's employment 
with the Department. Blauer's dismissal was for job abandonment and not 
for any job performance issues that may be directly or indirectly related to 
this appeal.1 Any remedy that Blauer may seek for any alleged violations of 
personnel rules has now been rendered moot. In particular, any 
reassignment of job duties - which has been the core remedy sought by 
Blauer throughout this and previous appeals — has been rendered moot 
because Blauer's employment has been appropriately terminated. Given that 
this appeal has been rendered moot, the Department respectfully asks this 
Court to vacate its decision in this matter and dismiss the appeal. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Issue Presented 
The Grievance and Appeal Procedure Act (GAPA)2 requires a grievant 
to file and pursue a grievance within express timelines. Failure to do so 
^ee Blauer, 2007 UT App 280 at f 1 (stating that Blauer was dismissed 
"for his failure to return to work within one year of taking leave"). CSRB 
noted that Blauer's intervening dismissal had rendered at least part of 
Blauer's claims moot. R. 687. The appeal of Blauer's dismissal was pending 
before this Court when CSRB issued its decision in this case. 
2GAPA is codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-101 to -408 (West 2004). 
2 
deprives a grievant not only of the right to CSRB review of the grievance but 
also of the right to judicial review. Here, Blauer did not dispute the 
Department's facts showing that he had failed to preserve and process his six 
new grievances as required by GAPA. Regardless of whether CSRB was 
bound by the district court's prior preservation ruling, did Blauer's failure to 
preserve his grievances nevertheless deprive this Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over this appeal? 
Court's Opinion 
A copy of the decision, Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 2008 
UT App 84 {Blauer II), is attached as the Addendum. 
Relief Requested 
This Court should vacate its memorandum decision and either dismiss 
the case for mootness or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Barney v. 
Division of Occupational & Prof I Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 543-44 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (stating that "[i]f the court concludes it does not have jurisdiction, 
it retains only the authority to dismiss the action"). 
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Facts 
After the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) ruled against Blauer on 
his demotion grievance, Blauer then filed a request for reconsideration, 
asking CSRB to review six new issues - alleged personnel violations - that he 
had not previously raised in the CSRB proceeding. R. 20-26, 27-149. Of the 
six new issues, one claim had been the subject of an earlier grievance within 
the Department, but had never been appealed to CSRB. R. 528-33, 548-49, 
642-43, 636. Four of the claims had never been raised in any antecedent 
grievance either within the Department or with CSRB. The final claim had 
never been raised as an antecedent grievance in its own right, but had only 
been asserted as part of Blauer's demotion grievance. Blauer did not contest 
these procedural facts, either before the CSRB or in his opening brief filed in 
this appeal. 
Argument 
Subject matter jurisdiction fails because Blauer's failure to timely bring his 
grievances deprived this Court of jurisdiction 
This Court overlooked its own lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
Blauer's six new claims of alleged personnel rule violations. Blauer's failure 
to preserve and process the new grievances within the statutory time limits 
4 
deprived not only CSRB of jurisdiction to hear those claims, but also 
precluded any judicial review of those claims. The Grievance and Appeal 
Procedure Act (GAPA) expressly limits the subject matter jurisdiction of both 
CSRB and any reviewing court: "Unless the employee meets the requirements 
for excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails to process the 
grievance to the next step within the time limits established by this part, he 
has waived his right to process the grievance or obtain judicial review of the 
grievance." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added); 
see also Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah App. 1998) 
(stating that "[GAPA1 explicitly prohibits judicial review of a career service 
employee's grievance when the employee has failed to pursue the grievance in 
a timely manner") (emphasis added); see also Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance v. Bd. of State Lands, 830 P.2d 233, 234, (Utah 1992) ("In the 
absence of a specific statute granting us jurisdiction over a writ of review 
from an agency proceeding, we have no jurisdiction/') 
Even if the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) may have been 
required, under the law of the case doctrine, to hear the merits of the six new 
claims, this Court is not similarly bound. A district court ruling does not 
relieve this Court of its "first duty to determine if it has jurisdiction/' Barney 
v. Division of Occupational & Prof I Licensing, 828 P.2d 542-543-44 (Utah Ct. 
5 
App. 1992). The Department argued twice in its answer brief that failing to 
pursue timely antecedent grievances deprives not only CSRB of jurisdiction to 
hear those grievances, but also deprives a reviewing court of jurisdiction. At 
pages 26-27 of its answer brief, the Department argued that "[b]ecause 
Blauer failed to meet the statutory time limits for processing his antecedent 
grievance claims, he waived both his right to grieve and his right to judicial 
review." (Emphasis in brief). The Department then cited to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401(4)(a) (West 2004) and included a parenthetical statement 
quoting language from the statute indicating that the right to judicial review 
is waived by a grievant's failure to bring an antecedent grievance. Likewise, 
the Department similarly argued at page 23 of its answer brief that "[flailure 
to meet the statutory time limits for processing a grievance results in both a 
waiver of the employee's right to grieve and of the right to judicial review/' 
(Emphasis in brief.) The Department then cited again to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401(4)(a) (West 2004), and also included a parenthetical statement 
quoting the supporting language of the statute. 
Accordingly, the Department respectfully asks this Court to reconsider 
its decision and inquire specifically into whether this Court - not just CSRB -
has jurisdiction to hear Blauer's six new claims. As set forth at pages 24-27 of 
the Department's answer brief, the undisputed facts in the record 
6 
demonstrate that Blauer did not raise antecedent grievances regarding four 
of the new claims, that he failed to appeal beyond the Department head 
regarding the fifth claim, and that his sixth claim was subsumed by his 
previous demotion appeal and had never been pursued as a grievance in its 
own right.3 This not only deprived CSRB of jurisdiction, but it also deprived 
this Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims. Due to a lack of 
jurisdiction, this Court had no authority to issue an order remanding the case 
to CSRB and its memorandum decision should therefore be vacated. See 
Barney, 828 P.2d 542-543-44 (stating that "[i]f the court concludes it does not 
have jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the action")-
Furthermore, this Court would continue to lack subject matter 
jurisdiction if this matter is appealed again after CSRB considers the merits 
of Blauer's six new grievances. Intervening consideration by CSRB would do 
nothing to change Blauer's failure to preserve his six new grievances for 
judicial review, because GAPA's preservation requirements will still not have 
been be met. Indeed, they can never be met because more than a year has 
3As noted at pages 21-22 in the Department's answer brief, Blauer's 
opening brief contained no discussion of Blauer's failure to preserve and 
process his grievances. Accordingly, Blauer waived any challenge to the 
undisputed evidence in the record that he had not preserved the grievances 
as required by GAPA. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89 at 1 23, 16 P.3d 540. 
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passed since the alleged events giving rise to the grievances. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 67-19a-401(5) & 67-19a-402 (West 2004) (specifying time limits for 
initiating and processing grievance with employing agency and to CSRB). 
This Court would also lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear Blauer's 
discrimination claims, since the exclusive remedy for discrimination claims 
lies with the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor and a subsequent 
appeal from that agency, not from CSRB. See Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 
842, 852 (Utah 2004) (stating that "the exclusive remedy for an employee 
claiming a violation of the UADA [Utah Antidiscrimination Act] is an appeal 
to the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor"); see also Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-5-107U5) (West 2004) (stating that UADA is the "exclusive remedy 
under State law for employment discrimination"). 
By erroneously taking jurisdiction now and remanding the case to 
CSRB, this Court would potentially be faced with a jurisdictional dilemma if 
the case is appealed again. This Court would have to either erroneously 
assume jurisdiction again to review CSRB's decision or decline jurisdiction 
due to Blauer's failure to preserve the grievances for judicial review. Instead, 
this Court should grant this petition for rehearing now, vacate its 
memorandum decision, and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction in the first instance. 
8 
Moreover, this Court's decision that the law of the case will always and 
unequivocally override all other considerations - including jurisdictional 
limitations set by statute - is contrary to public policy. When undisputed 
facts demonstrate a lack of both agency jurisdiction and court jurisdiction 
over matters expressly barred by statute, it is a waste of taxpayer resources 
to force an agency to nevertheless hear those barred claims. It is particularly 
wasteful here, where the scope the district court's preservation ruling is 
ambiguous. In citing the district court's memorandum decision, this Court 
omitted the following sentence, which at least raises a question as to whether 
the district court's preservation ruling was limited only to district court 
jurisdiction or also applied to CSRB's jurisdiction: "In other words, the Court 
declines to follow defendant's reasoning that these grounds for grieving were 
not raised administratively and are therefore deemed waived or that this 
Court has no jurisdiction to consider them." R. 579. 
Given this ambiguity, and that the district court's formal order only 
remanded the claims for consideration, without specifically requiring 
consideration on the merits, and given the undisputed facts demonstrating 
that Blauer has indeed failed to preserve his grievances, this Court should 
not have applied the law of the case doctrine. Instead it should have 
determined that the unique circumstances of this case - implicating subject 
9 
matter jurisdiction of both the reviewing agency and this Court - constitute 
an appropriate exception to the law of the case doctrine and therefore justify 
relieving CSRB of the district court's mandate. See Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 892 P.2d 1034,1038 (Utah 1995) (stating that "any change with 
respect to the legal issues governed by the mandate must be made by the 
appellate court that established it or by a court to which it, in turns, owes 
obedience") (emphasis added). 
Since a court can reconsider its own prior decision in contravention to 
the law of the case doctrine "when the court is convinced that its prior 
decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice," id., then 
surely a court can override a lower court's clearly erroneous jurisdictional 
determination to avoid a manifest injustice. The Department respectfully 
asserts that, where the undisputed evidence establishes that neither CSRB, 
the district court, nor this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, this Court's 
memorandum decision works a manifest injustice by requiring the CSRB and 
the parties to undergo the expense of a hearing on the merits. Such a result is 
particularly unjust, given that this case is now moot and that this Court 
would continue to lack jurisdiction if the case is appealed again. 
10 
Conclusion 
This case is now moot because this Court has affirmed the termination 
of Blauer's employment with the Department. In any event, this Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal because GAPA expressly 
restricts the subject matter jurisdiction of both CSRB and any reviewing 
court to only those grievances that have been timely preserved and pursued 
within the employing agency and then subsequently appealed to the CSRB. 
By not preserving his grievances, Blauer has deprived this Court of subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal, regardless of whether CSRB was 
bound by the law of the case to hear the grievances. In any event, the unique 
circumstances of this case justify an exception to a strict application of the 
law of the case doctrine. Accordingly, the Department respectfully asks this 
Court to grant this petition for rehearing, vacate its memorandum decision, 
and dismiss the appeal for mootness or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
11 
Good Faith Certification 
As required by Utah R. App. 35, the undersigned counsel certifies that 
this Petition is submitted in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of April, 2008. 
Clifford Petersen 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Department of Workforce Services 
Certificate of Service 
This is to certify that I mailed a TWO COPIES of the foregoing petition ty tna t i m 
Z&iayo to the following this / l ^ d a v of April, 2008: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert Thompson, Administrator 
Career Service Review Board 
Room 1120 State Office Building 
Capitol Hill 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1561 
12 
ADDENDUM 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00-
Lorin Blauer, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Department of Workforce 
Services, and Career Service 
Review Board, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20061177-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 3 , 2008) 
2008 UT App 84 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Vincent C. Rampton, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner 
Mark L. Shurtleff, J. Clifford Petersen, and Robert 
W. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and McHugh. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Lorin Blauer requests judicial review of the Career Service 
Review Board's (the CSRB) decision to grant the Department of 
Workforce Services's (the DWS) motion to dismiss six claims 
regarding the DWS's alleged personnel rule violations. Blauer 
contends that the CSRB erred by dismissing his claims for lack of 
jurisdiction because the district court had previously determined 
that Blauer had preserved his claims and had remanded the claims 
to the CSRB for consideration on the merits. We reverse and 
remand. 
Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, the CSRB was 
precluded from dismissing the remanded claims on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
The "law of the case" doctrine specifies that 
when a legal "decision [is] made on an issue 
during one stage of the case," that decision 
"is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation." Particularly when an appellate 
court makes a pronouncement on a legal issue, 
"[t]he lower court must not depart from the 
mandate . . . ." This is true even if the 
lower court "believe [s] that the issue could 
have been better decided in another fashion." 
Jensen v. IHC ^ Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, % 67, 82 P.3d 1076 
(alterations in original) (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995)). 
When the CSRB initially dismissed Blauer's claims against 
the DWS and denied his request for reconsideration, Blauer 
petitioned the district court for de novo review of the CSRB's 
action. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(l) (2004) (stating that 
"district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all 
final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings"). On review, the district court concluded that the 
CSRB correctly determined that Blauer had not been demoted and 
affirmed the CSRB!s dismissal of Blauer's demotion grievance. 
However, the district court rejected the contentions made by the 
DWS and the CSRB that Blauer's grievances based upon alleged 
violations of the personnel rules were "not raised 
administratively and . . . deemed waived or that [the district 
court] ha [d] no jurisdiction to consider them." In fact, the 
district court concluded "that [Blauer], in his Request for 
Reconsideration before the CSRB, preserved all of his remaining 
allegations concerning the defendant's violations of the 
Personnel Management Act." (Emphasis added.) 
Based on this language in the order, we conclude that the 
district court determined that Blauer's claims had been raised in 
such a way that there were no jurisdictional deficiencies at the 
agency or district court level. Thus, the district court's order 
of remand was an order to consider Blauer's claims on the merits. 
The DWS and the CSRB did not challenge the district court's 
conclusions regarding jurisdiction through an appeal to this 
court. As a result, the district court's conclusions became the 
law of the case, and the CSRB was bound by the district court's 
legal conclusions and mandates. The CSRB therefore erred by 
considering jurisdictional issues that had already been decided 
by the district court. 
Accordingly, we reverse the CSRB's dismissal of Blauer's six 
claims on jurisdictional grounds and remand the case to the CSRB 
for a hearing on the merits. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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